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Preface: 
On the Eradication of Smallpox  
and the Beginning of a Public Health Career
Donald A Henderson MD, MPH1
ABSTRACT
When I was a medical student, there were few lectures on public health at our 
university and such was true at most. The focus was on the treatment of individual 
patients with limited regard for the problems of the community. But as time has 
passed, there has been increasing concern about the population as a whole and 
approaches that might be appropriate for prevention of both acute and chronic 
diseases, for containing the spread of infection and for fostering healthy lifestyles. 
Many disciplines are involved but epidemiology, being the primary discipline of 
public health, lends itself well to serving as a common platform in joining all the 
disciplinary fields. Such was the case with the smallpox eradication program. The 
lessons learned from this experience are very relevant to current and future issues in 
public health.
This is undoubtedly the most exciting time in history to enter the field of public 
health—so much is changing and so many new opportunities are presenting as the 
importance  of  population-based  public  health  is  increasingly  perceived  by 
governments,  universities,  and  the  community  as  a  whole.  The  experience  of 
working on the eradication of smallpox was a major development in my career as it 
was for many colleagues who served with me. I am pleased to be able to share this 
experience  with  a  new  generation,  which  faces  both  enormous  challenges  and 
opportunities in disease control and health promotion. 
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I am frequently asked how I decided on my career and how I was able to 
undertake the many interesting and diverse adventures that I have. My 
simple answer is that I embarked on a public health career. My recruitment 
into public health was almost by accident, but I soon found that it provided 
such  fascinating,  ever-changing,  and  rewarding  challenges  that  I  never 
contemplated another option. Even now, after repeatedly retiring, I find 
myself absorbed with yet another set of challenging problems of national 
and international concern. 
Public health had no meaning for me until well after medical school. 
Familial expectations were that I would be a primary care physician. My 
mother was a nurse and a revered uncle, a general practitioner. I had no 
special exposure that permitted me to even understand what public health 
practitioners did. During medical school, there were only two lectures on 
public health. After a one year internship, a two year stint in the United 
States uniformed services was obligatory. I opted for the US Public Health 
Service and its Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS). It was part of the 
Communicable Disease Center (CDC). The decision was an arbitrary one, 
based solely on the belief that it might be intellectually rewarding as I knew 
so little about infectious diseases. 
During my two years in the EIS, I participated in a number of outbreak 
investigations. Each was different and each called on additional skills and 
knowledge. It was never dull and this is what fascinated me about public 
health.  In  1960,  after  a  medical  residency  and  MPH  training  at  Johns 
Hopkins, I returned to CDC where I was chief of the Surveillance Section. 
We focused on a number of infectious diseases of special concern. In 1961, 
smallpox became one of these. At that time, Europe was experiencing a 
number of smallpox importations from India and Pakistan. Travel was 
becoming more frequent and importations more likely. We needed to have 
a better understanding of how best to cope with an outbreak should it occur 
in the US. I endeavored to have one of our EIS officers participate with 
local public health authorities in each outbreak so as to better understand 
how best to handle an outbreak in the US should it occur. From these and 
other like experiences came a better appreciation of the importance of a 
diverse array of practices in different health systems. There was much we 
all had to learn. 
The EIS was popular among physicians as an option for discharging the 
obligatory two-year uniformed services duty and so we were able to recruit 
outstanding talent. Many became interested in public health as had I, and 
went on to careers in the field. It was a training program which ultimately 
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US, producing many deans and department chairs in schools of public 
health as well as two WHO Assistant Directors General, directors of CDC, 
state and county health directors, and many others in academic and research 
aspects of public health. 
During the course of preparations for dealing with a smallpox intro-
duction into the US, the issue arose about the logistics of vaccinating large 
numbers of people. All countries, the US included, feared smallpox being 
imported and spreading rapidly in the population, few of whom had been 
vaccinated  since  birth. We  believed  there  would  be  an  urgent  need  to 
vaccinate large numbers in the event of an introduction. Thus, we worked 
on adapting for smallpox vaccination, an instrument called a jet injector. It 
operated by firing through the skin a small amount of vaccine at high 
pressure to be deposited intradermally. We perfected this in a number of 
studies in Latin America and the South Pacific. As many as 1,000 people an 
hour could be vaccinated. It was one of several intiatives that moved us into 
the smallpox field. 
At the time, I was also working with the US Agency for International 
Development (AID) to identify possible short-term assignments for our 
EIS officers. AID had decided to make available measles vaccine for nine 
countries in West Africa and asked for nine EIS officers to spend six months 
each in helping to start the programs. The initiative was a reasonable one as 
deaths and complications due to measles were frequent in Africa. AID 
planned to support mass vaccination over four years. At that point, they 
expected that the countries involved would continue the programs them-
selves. However, I was troubled by this assumption. The vaccine then cost 
$1.75 USD a dose but these countries could not even afford yellow fever 
vaccine at ten cents per dose. To provide a needed vaccine for four years 
and then to stop it was a poor public health policy, as I saw it. But the 
question remained; how to respond to the AID request? We sought an 
alternate solution. We proposed instead that support be provided for an 
entire geographic bloc of countries to undertake country-wide smallpox 
vaccination  programs,  while  at  the  same  time  giving  measles  vaccine. 
During the four-year AID program, we thought it might be possible to stop 
the transmission of smallpox and, with smallpox vaccine costing only one 
cent per dose, the countries at least could sustain smallpox control even if 
they could not afford to continue measles vaccination. 
AID  had  budgeted  $5  million  USD  for  programs  that  would  be 
conducted in the French-speaking countries. The program we proposed 
would  cover  all  countries  in  West  Africa,  both  English-  and  French-
speaking. It amounted to 20 countries in all and would cost around $35 22 PublicHealthReviews,Vol.33,No1
million USD. We knew AID would reject this proposal but we hoped that 
some  sort  of  appropriate  compromise  might  be  reached. At  that  time, 
President Lyndon Johnson was trying to identify a program that he could 
announce as being a US contribution to the UN’s specially designated 
International  Cooperation Year.  His  staff  decided  that  the  West Africa 
program  would  be  an  ideal  choice.  This  was  a  much  more  ambitious 
program than we were prepared for. CDC had never had responsibility for 
an international program and thus was without an experienced staff or 
administrative structure The program would require recruiting an additional 
50 people plus administrative staff, procuring vehicles, vaccine and field 
equipment  and  reaching  needed  agreements  with  each  of  the  different 
countries. Dr. Alexander Langmuir, my chief as director of the epidemiology 
branch at CDC was angry that I had persuaded the government to fund such 
an unworkable project, which was so far beyond our capabilities. I tried to 
explain that none of us had expected the response we received. 
There was no option but to forge ahead. The program was approved in 
November of 1965 and I began working hard with a three person staff to 
attain  agreements  with  the  participating  countries  on  matters  such  as 
importation of equipment, vaccines, and plans of action, and recruiting 
advisory staff for the countries and training them. During this period, we 
crafted a detailed operational and instruction manual that called for a two-
part strategy. The first was to be a vaccination program designed to reach 
80 percent of the people and which would require small evaluation teams to 
follow the vaccination teams to validate that 80 percent were indeed being 
reached. This concept of quality control met with objections in practically 
every country, as the ministries simply could not see the value of assigning 
a vehicle and two people just to check on how other people were performing. 
They felt we should focus all efforts solely on administering vaccinations. 
However, this strategy proved to be critical. 
The second key component of the strategy was called surveillance and 
containment. The concept was to have each health unit report every week 
about the number of cases they had seen as well as the village of residence, 
age  and  previous  vaccination  status  of  the  patients.  When  cases  were 
reported, a two person team was to go to the outbreak site to search for 
other cases and to vaccinate contacts and nearby households. At that time, 
no health department required weekly reports from health units, nor was it 
policy to send special staff to an area of an outbreak. This second component, 
surveillance-containment, turned out to be amazingly effective in stopping 
smallpox, even in poorly vaccinated areas. This proved to be one of the 
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To staff the smallpox program, we recruited a disproportionately large 
number of younger people, in part because they were best able to adapt to 
living under rigorous field conditions and they were most receptive to 
exploring new approaches in disease control. But it seemed to me that all 
program staff needed to spend time working in the field to better understand 
smallpox and how best to deal with it. As director, I insisted that everyone 
spend at least a third of the time in the field talking to the people who were 
implementing the program locally and trying to understand what problems 
they were having and what we could do to make for a more efficient 
program.
In May of 1966, seven months after US approval of the West African 
program, the World Health Assembly convened its annual meeting. A major 
item  on  the  agenda  was  the  question  of  whether  or  not WHO  should 
intensify its efforts in smallpox programs in order to achieve eradication 
within ten years. The original proposal for global eradication had been 
made by the Soviet Union and was endorsed by the Assembly in 1959. Few 
resources were provided, however, and little progress was made. Delegates 
from the Soviet Union were angry because they felt that more money 
should be apportioned to this program, which they had so enthusiastically 
proposed. However, a large proportion of WHO funds were then being 
spent on malaria eradication, and the US was heavily supporting that effort 
both with human and material resources. 
Malaria eradication had begun in 1955 and by 1966, it was apparent that 
it was far more costly and less successful than had been hoped. Some 
argued that it was impossible to eradicate a disease and that failure of the 
malaria eradication effort simply confirmed that fact—the hypothesis being 
that in the evolutionary process, various organisms/species had come to 
occupy special niches and that an organism or species could not be removed 
without upsetting the balance of nature. 
The  WHO  Director  General  Marcelino  Candau  was  asked  by  the 
Assembly to prepare a report for the 1966 Assembly so that it could be 
decided once and for all if WHO should proceed with smallpox eradication 
or not. Although I was in the midst of endeavoring to set in motion the US 
West African program, I was directed to go to Geneva to work with WHO 
staff in preparing the Director General’s 1966 work-plan and budget. The 
proposed plan set forth the same two-part strategy we were designing for 
West Africa (i.e., both mass vaccination and a new surveillance-containment 
strategy). During the 1966 Assembly debate, a number of countries objected 
to WHO  undertaking  smallpox  eradication.  Some  believed  that  it  was 
impossible to achieve and if WHO were to fail with malaria eradication and 24 PublicHealthReviews,Vol.33,No1
then smallpox eradication, it would jeoporadize the credibility of both the 
organization and public health itself. Others objected to the additional costs 
to WHO. The US joined with the Russians in arguing for the ten-year 
eradication effort. After three days of debate, a vote was taken—58 votes 
were needed to approve the program; 60 voted in favor. The approved 
WHO annual budget for smallpox eradication was $2.8 million USD. The 
Director-General, who had bitterly opposed the program asked that an 
American direct it so that when it failed, the US would be seen to bear 
responsibility. I was designated to be the director.
When the program began, in 1967, 43 countries were reporting cases of 
smallpox. More than 10 million cases and two million deaths were estimated 
to have occurred that year. The jet injector guns quickly came into use 
throughout Brazil and West Africa, but it was soon found that they were 
difficult  to  maintain  and  frequently  needed  repair.  Large  numbers  of 
vaccinations could be administered but with many small, scattered villages, 
guns  that  could  vaccinate  1,000  people  an  hour  were  not  particularly 
advantageous. Vaccination was customarily performed by placing a drop of 
the smallpox vaccine suspension on the skin and making scratches through 
the drop. This would implant the virus in the superficial layers of the skin 
and the virus would grow and stimulate production of serum antibody. This 
protected  the  individual  against  infection  both  by  Vaccinia  virus  and 
smallpox.  There  were  many  failures  of  vaccination,  however,  because 
proper vaccination technique was difficult to perform. About this time, a 
scientist at Wyatt Laboratories in the US invented a small instrument called 
a bifurcated needle. It was extremely inexpensive; it greatly simplified 
vaccination technique; and it required use of only one-fourth as much 
vaccine as was required by conventional procedures. We confirmed its 
efficacy in the field and introduced it throughout all programs. 
The quality of vaccine was a significant problem. It was produced in 
many different laboratories but, as we were to discover, most of the vaccine 
failed to meet minimum standards. A laboratory in Canada and one in the 
Netherlands agreed to test samples of all vaccine. We insisted that no 
vaccine be used which did not meet international standards. This was the 
first time that WHO had taken such a position, effectively certifying a 
national product. Experts from five laboratories met to develop a standard 
operations manual and to advise the different producers. By 1972, five 
years into the program, more than 80 percent of the vaccine was being 
produced  in  the  developing  countries  themselves  and  all  met  required 
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Oversight for the global program was performed with a WHO head-
quarters staff of only nine people, including three secretaries. Programs 
were conducted in more than 50 countries, but no more than 150 inter-
national staff persons were in the field at any given time. They included 
both WHO full- and part-time staff as well as volunteers from the US Peace 
Corps,  Japan,  and  Austria  and  others  from  CDC,  OXFAM  and  non-
govermental organizations. National staff numbered as many as 150,000 
persons. Our international staff could serve as catalysts and advisers but it 
is evident that national staff were the ones primarily responsible for the 
success of the eradication effort.
We encouraged innovation and sought to learn from what was successful. 
This was not easy as there was no electronic mail system and no dependable 
intercountry  telephone  communication.  We  depended  on  mail  service, 
periodic regional meetings and a great deal of personal travel by head-
quarters staff. Every three weeks we prepared a special report for the WHO 
Weekly Epidemiological Record which detailed numbers of cases reported; 
progress being made (or not) in specific countries; and new findings of 
operational importance. Those in the countries, both national and inter-
national staff, developed a sense of both pride and ownership in what they 
were doing and what others were doing as well.
The program initially made dramatic progress. Within three and a half 
years, all 20 of the countries of West Africa were free of smallpox. East 
Africa was also progressing well and both Indonesia and Brazil became 
smallpox free. Six years into the program, there were only five countries 
that still had endemic smallpox—the Asian countries of India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and Nepal and, in Africa, Ethiopia. However, the population of 
the endemic areas numbered more than 700 million persons and progress 
was far slower than what we had hoped.
In the spring of 1973, we discussed with the Indian government a new 
operational strategy—an active outreach program to mobilize health service 
staff  to  visit  every  village  in  India  within  ten  days  to  find  cases  and 
immediately thereafter to contain outbreaks. As we discovered, there was a 
surprising amount of active movement of people throughout the country—
entire families travelling by road and rail into and out of urban centers. 
Smallpox was spreading faster than we were able to detect and contain the 
outbreaks. The initial search attempts began in the autumn and involved 
upwards of 130,000 health workers. At first, they sought information from 
residents in different areas in each village. Tens of thousands of new and 
unreported cases were discovered and outbreaks contained. During sub-
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their areas within the ten-day period. Independent teams verified that at 
least 90 percent of the houses had been visited or the search in the area was 
repeated. 
By  January  1974,  we  were  convinced  that  we  had  the  answer  for 
stopping smallpox in the most difficult of the remaining countries, but other 
problems intruded. A gasoline strike cut off petrol supplies, the airlines and 
then the railroads went on strike and then the heaviest rains in 30 years 
struck the most heavily populated states. Hundreds of thousands of refugees 
fled, carrying smallpox with them. In May of that year, India reported the 
trial detonation of its atomic weapon. The international press highlighted 
this event but also noted that India was experiencing some of the most 
serious epidemics of smallpox in its history. The Prime Minister was deeply 
concerned and redoubled support to the program. In May of 1975, the last 
case occured in India and in August, the Prime Minister announced India’s 
freedom from smallpox for the first time in its recorded history. The last 
case of smallpox in Asia was finally contained in Bangladesh in November 
1975. 
This left us only with Ethiopia, a huge country with few roads. In 1974, 
Emperor Haile Sellassie had been assassinated and civil war broke out. 
Most countries evacuated their national staff from the country. The only 
group that did not evacuate was the WHO smallpox staff who continued 
working,  often  under  military  escort.  On  nine  occasions,  teams  were 
kidnapped and taken to Somalia. Finally, in October 1976, Ethiopia became 
free of smallpox only to find that the disease had been reintroduced in 
Somalia and another year of work was required. Finally on October 26, 
1977, the last case occurred in Merca, Somalia—the last case in a continuing 
human chain of infection extending back at least 3,500 years. 
For more than two years, countries continued their surveillance pro-
grams and searched suspect areas for possible hidden foci; a substantial 
reward was offered for anyone who reported a case of smallpox, but there 
were no others. An independent international commission monitored pro-
gress and offered suggestions as to special studies that might be undertaken 
that  would  permit  them  to  be  fully  assured  that  eradication  had  been 
achieved. In December 1979, they announced that they were satisfied that 
smallpox had been eradicated and this was confirmed at a plenary meeting 
of the World Health Assembly on May 8, 1980. They advised that smallpox 
vaccination be stopped everywhere. 
What was the legacy of smallpox eradication? The end of smallpox 
marked the end of smallpox vaccination but it had ushered in the beginning 
of a new era, which has been termed the Era of Vaccination. The new WHO EradicationofSmallpox 27
initiative is called the Expanded Program on Immunization and this now 
extends throughout the world. 
From the earliest days of the programs in Africa, we were surprised by 
the  enthusiastic  response  that  greeted  well-organized  mass  vaccination 
efforts utilizing mobile teams and intended to vaccinate large numbers of 
people rapidly and with high rates of coverage. The key was good team 
management,  active  participation  by  local  staff  and  support  by  village 
leaders. It was readily possibly for a vaccination team of four to vaccinate, 
on average, 2,000 persons per day, which translates into 10,000 persons per 
week. Coverage of 90 percent or more was usual. It seemed only logical to 
ask,  why  not  administer  other  vaccines  then  in  common  use  in  the 
industrialized countries—DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus), measles and 
polio? Coverage with these vaccines seldom exceeded 10 to 15 percent in 
any  developing  country.  At  the  time,  only  a  few  countries  had  ever 
undertaken a national program intended to vaccinate all people throughout 
the entire country. We convened an international meeting in 1970 and it 
endorsed such a program. This was approved in the WHO Assembly in 
1974. UNICEF and Rotary International gave the program priority and a 
target  was  set  to  reach  80  percent  of  the  world’s  children  by  1990. 
Amazingly, that target was met. 
In the Americas, this program proceeded especially well and in 1985, 
the countries of WHO’s Pan American Health Organization decided to 
eradicate polio using oral polio vaccine (OPV). A five year goal was set and 
achieved. Subsequently, this methodology was adopted for a global polio 
eradication effort. Meanwhile, the countries of the Americas succeeded in 
interrupting both measles and rubella transmission. Other vaccines are now 
in widespread use. The smallpox program demonstrated how much could 
be done with vaccination and how inexpensively even where the overall 
health  services  were  limited.  It  demonstrated,  as  well,  that  skills  in 
surveillance and management and in social mobilization were important.
A substantial proportion of the US and WHO international staff who 
served in the program were under 40 years of age. Subsequently, many of 
them,  invigorated  by  the  program,  altered  career  plans  and,  as  I  did, 
embarked on a public health path. A motivation was the recognition of how 
much could be done and how satisfying it was to deal with public health 
challenges. Contrary to what some believe, public health involves a great 
deal  more  than  paper  shuffling.  Last  year,  I  published  a  book  entitled 
Smallpox-DeathofaDisease, with the intention of providing an illustrative 
case  history  of  the  joys,  as  well  as  the  vicissitudes,  of  the  smallpox 
eradication adventure. 28 PublicHealthReviews,Vol.33,No1
The  conquest  of  smallpox  has  been  lauded  as  one  of  the  greatest 
achivements in the history of medicine. It was a victory achieved by a great 
many  dedicated,  imaginative  people  who  did  not  know  that  smallpox 
eradication had been deemed by many professionals to be an impossible 
goal.
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Addendum: Editor’s Note:
Smallpox  is  an  acute  contagious  disease  caused  by  the Variola  virus.  Having 
originated more than 3,000 years ago in India or Egypt, smallpox is one of the most 
devastating diseases known to mankind. For centuries, repeated epidemics swept 
across continents and decimated populations. The disease, for which there was no 
effective treatment, killed as many as 30 percent of those infected and left survivors 
blind,  disfigured  and  marginalized.  For  centuries,  protection  was  sought  by 
variolation which meant infecting people deliberately with smallpox to prevent 
epidemics and sometimes providing a lucrative practice for fashionable physicians. 
In 1796, a rural general practitioner, Edward Jenner, noting that milkmaids did not 
get smallpox, used cowpox pus from the finger of dairymaid Sarah Nelmes to infect 
a young boy, James Phipps, who then became immune to smallpox. This became 
known as vaccination and was adopted widely to prevent epidemics, but the disease 
continued to rampage in many parts of the world well into the second half of the 
twentieth century.
In 1967, when the disease still threatened 60 percent of the world’s population, 
WHO launched an intensified plan to eradicate smallpox. Through the success of 
the global eradication campaign, smallpox was finally pushed back to the horn of 
Africa with the last recorded case in Somalia in 1977. The World Health Assembly 
in 1980 declared smallpox eradicated from the face of the earth. 
In  May  2010,  a  statue  to  commemorate  the  30th  anniversary  of  smallpox 
eradication was erected in the gardens of WHO. At the unveiling ceremony, WHO’s 
Director General Dr Margaret Chan applauded health workers from around the 
world whose dedicated work over 14 years made this possible.EradicationofSmallpox 29
The boldness of undertaking such a mission, and the creative management and 
adaptation to shifting circumstances place this as one of the great dramas in human 
historic public health achievement as related modestly by Dr Henderson in this 
preface  to  the  Public  Health  Reviews  issue  on  Public  Health  Education.  The 
application  of  lessons  learned  from  this  experience  should  inspire  faculty  and 
students of public health for generations to come, and help in defining goals and 
strategies to the many population health issues that exist now and lie ahead in 
developed and developing countries.
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